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The current study is motivated by the overall lackluster performance of IMF programmes in recip ient 
countries in terms of economic growth consequences, and tries to explore the relevance of institutional 
determinants (that have a positively significant role in improving institutional quality  in IMF programme 
countries, in the first place) in enhancing real economic growth in IMF programme countries; as otherwise 
highlighted by New Institutional Economics literature for countries generally. Moreover, the study also 
investigates the impact of these determinants through the channel of macroeconomic stability. Based on a 
time period of 1980-2010 (co inciding with a durat ion of increasing number of IMF programmes), the results 
mainly validate that institutional determinants overall play a positive role in reducing macroeconomic 
instability, and through it, and also independently, enhance real economic growth.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
During the last three decades or so, many countries have received once or have been 
prolonged users1 of International Monetary Fund (IMF; or simply the 'Fund') resources, but 
research literature points to the fact that most of them have not been able to achieve 
macroeconomic stability on sustained basis (Evrensel, 2002; Easterly, 2005).  
 
                                                                 
1
 Independent Evaluation Office (IEO, 2002, p. 9 and 24) indicates that a country which remains in an IMF 
programme for at least 7 years in a 10 year time period, is referred to as a prolonged user. 
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At the same time, it has been pointed out that too much focus of the IMF on the demand 
side of the economy, at the cost of supply side, has led to the impact of IMF programmes 
at most being neutral (and in some countries even negative) on economic growth of 
programme countries (Haque and Khan, 1998; Bird, 2001; Bird, 2007; Arpac et al., 2008).  
 
NIE (New Institutional Economics) literature, on the other hand, indicates that countries 
which saw improvement in institutional quality, also witnessed their per capita incomes 
improving (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Afonso and Jalles, 2011).  Actually, NIE points 
out that institutional quality improves when an environment is created (for example, by 
reducing transaction costs through providing better education, protecting property rights, 
providing better environment for businesses mainly through ensuring enforcement of 
contracts, improving rule of law) that incentivises people to invest in the economy, and in 
turn contribute to economic growth. 
 
Given the consequence of IMF programmes at most being neutral for economic growth, on 
one hand, and institutional determinants significantly affecting economic growth in 
countries overall, on the other hand, the paper intends to explore the possibility in IMF 
programme countries, that significant institutional determinants (obtained from Javed, 
2014) positively impact real GDP both directly, and then indirectly through the 
macroeconomic stability channel.  
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The study is structured in the following way: relevant literature is reviewed in Section II, 
followed by discussion of data and methodology in Section III, while Section IV highlights 
estimation and results. Conclusion of the study is given in the last section.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Ever since the Third World Debt crisis of the 1980s, IMF enhanced its role, mainly 
through its structural adjustment window; resulting in turn, in greater focus of economic 
research to gauge the impact of IMF programmes on the economic performance of 
recipient countries. 
 
A lot of countries have been under the IMF programmes during the last three decades. 
Therefore, there has been an effort by researchers to understand the impact of these 
programmes, for which different approaches have been employed. Haque and Khan (1998; 
p. 7) pointed out that the difference between these methodologies fundamentally lay in the 
way the 'counterfactual' was formulated, which served as a benchmark to gauge the 
performance of the 'actual outcome' against a macroeconomic outcome existing in a world 
of no programme (i.e., the 'counterfactual').  
 
Haque and Khan (1998; p. 8-12) indicated that due to informational constraints with regard 
to structural parameters and policy reaction function parameters, different programme 
evaluation methods construct counterfactuals differently; with approaches being (i) before-
after (BA; evaluates macroeconomic performance under and before the programme; but 
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suffers from over-simplification by excluding the impact of any exogenous factors), (ii) 
with-without (WW; where a group of non-programme countries is taken as a 'control 
group' and the performance of a programme country is compared with it ; with major 
shortcoming in terms of assuming that programme and non-programme countries are same 
prior to the start of the programme, which is especially problematic given the programme 
country is crisis hit to start with, suffering in turn the non-random selection bias with 
regard to selection of programme countries), (iii) generalized evaluation estimator (GEE) 
approach (while it also compares programme and non-programme countries, it controls for 
initial conditions and exogenous influences), and (iv) comparison of simulations (SIM; 
compares simulated performance of countries under hypothetical Fund programmes and 
non-Fund policies; but has the shortcoming that the required underlying econometric 
model that captured the whole spectrum of a typical Fund programme, is not available). 
 
Using BA approach, while Khan and Knight (1981) reported a negative impact, Killick et 
al. (1992) pointed towards a positive impact of IMF programmes on economic growth of 
recipient countries; where Evrensel (2002) indicated a neutral impact on economic growth. 
Similarly using WW approach, while Donovan (1981) found out a positive impact of Fund 
programmes on economic growth, Loxley (1984) pointed towards a neutral effect on 
growth. Hence, the underlying weak assumptions with regard to formulation of 
counterfactual in the BA and WW approaches may be the reason why different studies 
using these methodologies produced results that are all over the place, making it difficult to 
conclude anything substantively with regard to the impact of IMF programmes on 
economic growth of recipient countries.  
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Having said that, formulation of a more informed counterfactual, using GEE methodology 
gave more consistent results, which most often than not indicated that Fund programmes 
had a negative impact on economic growth of recipient countries. Hence, for example, 
Goldstein and Montiel (1986) using data from 1974-1981, and employing GEE 
methodology pointed out a negative impact of Fund programmes on economic growth. 
Similarly, Barro and Lee (2005) using GEE methodology (and by employing data from 
1975 to 2000) indicated that Fund lending retarded economic growth. Also, Dreher (2006), 
who covered a time period from 1970-2000, pointed out an overall negative impact on 
economic growth. Furthermore, Nsouli et al. (2004) also indicated that Fund programmes 
remained neutral in terms of their impact on economic growth.  
 
A further review of literature to see the detailed impact of IMF programmes revealed a 
lackluster performance in terms of individual macroeconomic indicators of recipient 
countries, along with highlighting the emergence and persistence of recidivism in IMF 
programme countries. While Khan (1990) and Pastor (1987) discovered significant 
positive impacts on the overall balance of payments, Conway (2006) indicated that the 
impact has reduced since the 1970s and 1980s. Evrensel (2002; p. 586) found out that 
previous programme countries entered a new one at the back of an even worse 
macroeconomic situation (as compared to the situation when they were not in the 
programme in the first place), because of the existence of moral hazard in terms of easily 
available financing. Also, he indicated that significant improvement achieved in terms of 
current account and foreign exchange reserves, could not be sustained after the duration of 
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the programme. Also, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), using data from 1951 to 1990, 
show that countries in a programme lowered their growth rates, which otherwise grew 
faster once they left the programme. 
 
Furthermore, the research conducted by Barro and Lee (2005) did not see any significant 
consequence of IMF programmes for either investment or inflation; and could not find 
positive consequence on economic growth in recipient countries, who remained frequent 
borrowers from IMF. Bird (1996) pointed out that till the Fund programmes focused on 
improving economic growth as the top priority on its agenda (taking in turn a long term 
perspective of the BOP), recipient countries would continue to remain recidivist. Similarly, 
Hutchison and Noy (2003), pointed out low programme completion rates and recidivism, 
high output costs, and no improvement of current account for Latin America.  
 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) using actual monetary values of IMF lending (rather 
than the number of programmes approved by the Fund, since according to the them there 
remained a high level of non-completion of IMF programmes) pointed out that while 
Fund's overall objective for crisis-hit countries was to put them on stable economic growth 
footings, yet the impact of Fund programmes is either neutral or negative, given their 
policies have an adverse impact for public and private investment; revealing in turn that the 
Fund in putting too much emphasis on the demand side, neglecting the supply side of the 
economy in the process. One of the main steps in this regard, according to NIE is 
improving institutions so that the transaction costs can be lowered to induce investment 
(which in turn helps boost economic growth).  
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With regard to the prolonged users, Easterly (2005) indicated that during 1980-99 these 
countries were unable to achieve either reasonable growth or deal convincingly with 
macroeconomic distortions.  
 
Given this background while the Fund also realized and internalized this performance and 
criticism (IMF 2005a; IEO, 2007), researchers have criticised and asked IMF to improve 
its Financial Programming Framework (FPP) for better results for recipient countries in 
terms of consequences for macroeconomic stability and economic growth (IEO, 2007; Bird 
and Willett, 2004). For instance, Bird (2007) found the criticism to be legitimate since it 
found IMF programmes to be 'over simplistic'. Moreover, Buira (1983) called on the Fund 
to revisit its financial programming techniques for certain cases. Also, Bird (2001) asked 
IMF to redesign its programmes. More specifically, Abbot et al. (2010) while analyzing 
impact of programmes on developing countries, criticized Fund to be too rigid and 
conventional/uniform in its approach in terms of its conditionalities2, and this formed as 
one of the reasons for its impact neutral performance with regard to economic growth; in 
turn asked for a fresh approach. 
  
In terms of suggesting specific remedies, Khan and Knight (1985), for instance, indicated 
the negative impact on economic growth could be restricted to short-term in case supply-
side policies were pursued. Moreover, Arpac et al. (2008) suggested to IMF to focus on 
domestic politics also while forming expectations about the extent of programme 
                                                                 
2
 The process of conditionality is whereby installments are released on a quarterly basis, at the back of successfully 
meet ing benchmarks, which are pre-decided with regard to performance (Barro and Lee, 2005, p.1248).  
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implementation in a country. At the same time, Nsouli et al. (2004) pointed out that most 
research on gauging impact of Fund programmes did not take into account the underlying 
role of institutional quality in programme success rate. Furthermore, pointed out that in 
programme countries, better institutional quality and conducive political environment had 
positive consequences for macroeconomic outcomes, and programme implementation 
rates.  
 
Research literature of NIE has found that improvement in institutional determinants had an 
overall positive and significant bearing on the economic growth of countries (for example, 
Rodrik et al., 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999). For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2004) while 
analyzing the different institutions of North and South Korea, pointed out that unlike the 
North, in the South, by taking political and economic institutions were strengthened for 
example, policy decisions were taken democratically, protecting private property, and 
developing markets. This led to greater economic growth and development in South Korea 
over the years, as compared to North Korea, even though both countries shared the same 
culture since they were one country under the Japanese occupation (which ended in 1945, 
and the division subsequently). Similarly, improvement in institutions (both political and 
economic) led Botswana experience very high growth rates during the last three decades or 
so (Acemoglu et al., 2003a; Parsons and Robinson, 2006).  
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III. Data and Methodology 
 
Theoretical design 
 
The main motivation of the current study is based on the 'missing link', which identifies 
itself as the effect of institutions on economic growth of IMF programme countries; given 
the background of a lackluster performance of IMF programmes for recipient countries in 
terms of economic growth consequence (mainly due to insufficient focus on the supply 
side of the economy) and the importance of institutions in improving growth rates in 
countries, as revealed by the research literature of NIE. Hence, the current study makes an 
effort to explore this 'missing link' by analysing the impact of institutional determinants on 
economic growth of IMF programme countries, with the underlying premise that 
improvement in institutional determinants both directly, and indirectly (through the 
channel of macroeconomic stability) positively impact real GDP. 
 
As indicated earlier, NIE literature indicates that institutions have a significantly positive 
bearing on real economic growth (Rodrik et al., 2002; Ugur, 2010). Ugur (2010) for 
example, drew the same conclusion from many studies conducted between 1995-2004, 
indicating also at the same time that the direction of causation was significantly from 
institutions to economic performance (Ugur, 2010, p.16). In the current analysis, the same 
is being premised for IMF programme countries: 
 
Real GDP = f (institutional determinants, other variables)                      [a]    
        (+) 
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At the same time, it has been advocated, for example by Acemoglu et al. (2003b) that the 
main reason behind macroeconomic instability and the varying levels of volatility among 
different countries were related more with institutional reasons than the traditionally 
identified macroeconomic determinants. Similarly, better budgetary institutions (which are 
important economic institutions) had a negatively significant impact on (budget) deficit 
(von Hagen, 1991). Hence, the current study considers the notion that institutional 
determinants in IMF programme countries negatively impact macroeconomic instability:  
 
Macroeconomic Instability = f (institutional determinants, other variables)                      [b] 
              (-)   
 
In a case study of Iran conducted by Haghighi et al. (2012) it was pointed out that there 
existed a long-term relation between economic growth and macroeconomic instability. 
Therefore, lastly, it is also premised here that macroeconomic instability has a negative 
bearing on real GDP in IMF programme countries: 
 
Real GDP = f (macroeconomic instability, other variables)                                  [c] 
        (-) 
 
For the purpose of analysis, the institutional determinants to be employed will be the 
significant determinants of institutional quality taken from Javed (2014). 
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Sample 
 
Out of the total IMF member countries at 188 IMF member country data from IMF 
website3, countries that have remained under the IMF programme  at one time or the other 
(otherwise called 'programme countries') have been found out from, to stand at 129 during 
the sample period (1980-2010). Furthermore, for the purposes of analysis, programme 
countries have been sub-divided into two groups of 'prolonged users' and 'non-prolonged 
users4'. They are 44 and 85 programme countries, respectively, during the same time 
period5. 
 
Data and variable description 
 
Data on real GDP is taken from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the IMF6.  
 
Based on the methodology and definitions of Ismihan (2003), Macroeconomic Instability 
Index (MII)7 has been constructed using the following five8 indicators: 
 
(i) inflation rate (calculated by taking  data on GDP Deflator from WEO), 
 
                                                                 
3
 See complete list of IMF member countries at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/ 
4
 The author has used the terminology of non-prolonged users to represent a group of programme countries that have 
remained under an IMF programme for less than 7 years  in a decade. 
5
 See lists of prolonged users and non-prolonged users at Appendix-A. 
6
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx 
7
 For details, see Ismihan (2003;  pp. 214-15), who constructed MII. 
8
 It may be indicated here that while Is mihan (2003) only included the first four indicators to construct the MII, the 
current study augments it with one more indicator.  
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(ii) budget deficit as percentage of GDP is (taken from WEO),  
(iii) general government gross debt as percentage of GDP (obtained from WEO),  
 
(iv) exchange rate variability has been calculated on the basis of 12 month end-of-period 
nominal exchange rate in SDR, taken from International Finance Statistics (IFS; IMF)9 
and, 
 
(v) Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (REERI; taken from WDI10 of the World Bank). 
This indicator has been included in Ismihan (2003) to augment MII to include the impact 
of competitiveness in it. Furthermore, it needs to be indicated that another index in this 
regard called the Macroeconomic Stability Subindex11, produced by World Economic 
Forum. The reason it has not been employed in the current analysis because of lack of 
consistency of its methodology; in turn, inhibiting comparability of data over longer 
periods of time.  
 
Political/governance related indicators. From Javed (2014), significant variables include 
regime, military, civil liberties, and aggregate governance index12. 
 
Economic variables. From Javed (2014) significant variables include KOF Index of 
Globalization, monetary freedom, investment freedom, and property rights13. The other 
                                                                 
9
 Data taken from IFS-CD ROM (Version 1.2.133). 
10
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicator 
11
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competit iveness_Reports/Reports/GCR_05_06/Composition_of_the_Growt
h_Competit iveness_Index 
12
 For details see Javed (2014). 
13
 For details see Javed (2014). 
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significant determinant of institutional quality from Javed (2014) that is real GDP, has not 
been included here, since the dependent variable is also real GDP.  
  
Control variables. They include government spending and population taken from WDI. 
 
Endogeneity. Based on literature review (for instance discussion of institutions in NIE 
literature; see for example Acemoglu et al., 2001), it has been realized that the problem of 
endogeneity exists for many variables. Endogenous variables include lagged GDP, MII 
(lagged and predicted also), government spending, aggregate governance index, KOF 
Index of Globalization, monetary freedom, investment freedom, and property rights. The 
exogenous variables on the other hand, include, population, regime, military, and civil 
liberties. 
 
Econometric methodology 
 
As explained in the theoretical design, the purpose here is to estimate the impact of 
institutional determinants (obtained from Javed, 2014) both directly and then indirectly 
(through Macroeconomic Instability Index) on real GDP, in terms of 'prolonged users' and 
'non-prolonged users'. Therefore, in line with the design, the first equation will be 
estimated as follows:  
 
      =                                           [1] 
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where,        stands for log real GDP.    is the country-fixed effect.           stands for 
lagged log real GDP.     is a vector of significant political/governance related indicators, 
and     is a vector of significant economic variables from Javed (2014); while     is a 
vector of control variables.    is the t-1time specific dummy.     is the error term. 
 
While Eq[1] is estimated to check the direct impact of significant determinants of 
institutional quality on real GDP, the next two equations will together indirectly estimate 
this impact, as follows:  
 
     =                                             [2] 
 
where, MII stands for Macroeconomic Instability Index, while          stands for lagged 
MII.  
 
 is the country-fixed effect, while    ,    , once again are a vector of significantly 
positive determinants of institutional quality from Javed (2014);    is a t-1 time specific 
dummy, and     is the error term. 
 
and, 
 
     =           +       +             [3] 
 
where,       stands for log real GDP.    is the country-fixed effect.       stands for 
predicted values of MII for Eq [2].     are the control variables,    is the t-1 time specific 
dummy, while     is the error term. 
15 
 
 
Hence, in Eq [2], the impact of significant determinants of institutional quality is 
investigated on MII, while in Eq [3] the impact of MII is explored on real GDP.  
 
The underlying premise for employing this indirect approach is to see the importance of 
institutional focus for IMF programmes in improving macroeconomic stability, and also, 
economic growth. The basis for this here is that as institutional quality improves, it will 
reduce macroeconomic instability, and also as macroeconomic instability decreases it will 
enhance real GDP. 
 
The above equations (Eq[1] to Eq[3]) are being estimated using Arellano and Bover (1995) 
approach. The big advantage of this approach is that it uses the information in the 
equations simultaneously from level and difference forms. For this purpose, we take the 
difference of all equations, as follows: 
 
                                     +        [4] 
 
                                   +         [5] 
 
                                              +       [6] 
 
These equations also serve the purpose of removing any possible heterogeneity in the 
models above (where   indicate change between years t and t-1 for a variable).  
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For the estimation of the models, like the ones above, the approach of Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) has been recommended by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998)14. The GMM approach in the estimation of these types of models 
enhances efficiency through addition of more instruments to the system of equations, i.e. 
on level and difference. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
are used as instruments to resolve the problem of autocorrelation. All the above models are 
estimated using robust standard errors to address the problem of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
IV. Estimation and Results 
 
All the models have been estimated separately on the two sub-groups of programme 
countries, being 'prolonged users' and 'non-prolonged users'. The reason behind taking 
these two groups is based on the inherent difference in economic environment of these two 
sub-groups, where the prolonged users are generally composed of very underdeveloped 
economies (and hence the need for entering frequent IMF programmes), while the non-
prolonged users are more representative of economies that are overall more developed than 
the prolonged users.  
 
Tables 1(a) and 1(b) highlight the impact of institutional determinants on real GDP for 
prolonged and non-prolonged users, respectively. On the other hand, Tables 2(a) and 2(b), 
estimate the impact of institutional determinants on MII (once again for both prolonged 
                                                                 
14
 The Stata command, 'xtabond2' developed by Roodman (2009) was used to estimate all equations. 
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and non-prolonged users). Thereafter, Tables 3(a) and 3(b), estimate the impact of 
predicted MII (   ) on real GDP (in terms of the two sub-groups of programme countries).   
 
Upfront it may be pertinent to indicate that instruments were valid and exogenous15, since 
they passed the Hansen-J statistic test of Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR; Hansen, 
1982).  
 
In Tables 1(a) and 1(b), Lagged real GDP is positive and significant for real GDP in the 
case of both prolonged users and non-prolonged users; hence, highlighting the presence of 
dynamic process. At the same time, in both the sub-groups of program countries, 
population in many of the models has a significantly negative bearing on real GDP, while 
government spending overall has positive consequence for real GDP. 
 
It can be seen in Tables 1(a) and 1(b) through the institutional determinant ‘regime’, that as 
compared to presidential form of democracy, parliamentary form of democracy is more 
conducive for enhancing real GDP. At the same time, a military officer as chief executive 
is detrimental to improvement in real GDP (i.e. has a significantly negatively impact) for 
prolonged users; the same consequence is also prevalent although insignificantly in the 
case of non-prolonged users. Moreover, the two tables highlight that civil liberties 
positively and significantly contribute in enhancing real GDP in the case of both sub-
groups.  
 
                                                                 
15
 For details, see Roodman (2007). 
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Aggregate governance index highlights its importance in enhancing real economic growth 
since it holds significantly positive consequence for real GDP in both the prolonged and 
non-prolonged users. Similarly, Toye (1993) for example, highlighted the significance 
states hold in providing conducive environment for better functioning of markets, which in 
turn helps reduce transactions costs, supporting economic activity in the process.  
 
The importance of openness of the economy is reflected in KOF index of globalization 
having a significantly positive impact on real GDP. Also, monetary freedom significantly 
enhances real GDP for both the sub-groups. At the same time while investment freedom 
overall holds a positive consequence for non-prolonged users, it is significant in the case of 
prolonged users. 
 
Property rights that play an important role in reducing transaction costs (that helps enhance 
investment) remains positive for real GDP for both the sub-groups. Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005; p. 953) pointed out that countries where institutions protected property rights more, 
performed better in terms of indictors related with investment, credit to private sector, 
stock markets, and income per capita. A similar result is pointed out by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) in terms of Netherlands and UK paying greater attention to developing 
private property protection institutional framework, and in turn growing quicker than their 
neighbours. Having said that, the fact that the institutional determinant of property rights is 
insignificant in both the sub-groups, underlines the need for strengthening the supporting 
institutional set up so that the impact of property rights on real GDP could possibly 
become more effective. 
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Table 1(a). Dependent variable -real GDP- prolonged users 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Lag Log GDP 0.978*** 0.852*** 0.912*** 0.304*** 0.357*** 0.361*** 0.353*** 1.007*** 
 (0.00974) (0.0357) (0.0193) (0.0486) (0.0472) (0.0471) (0.0499) (0.0101) 
Log Population -0.000131 0.00177 -0.0594* -0.204*** -0.175*** -0.177*** -0.188*** -0.00186 
 (0.00352) (0.0197) (0.0352) (0.0717) (0.0667) (0.0685) (0.0689) (0.00336) 
Government Spending -4.49e-05 0.000101 0.000212 0.000430*** 0.000290** 0.000306** 0.000253* -0.000146 
 (0.000151) (0.000203) (0.000173) (0.000148) (0.000139) (0.000139) (0.000141) (0.000274) 
Regime 0.0299**       0.0112 
 (0.0152)       (0.0106) 
Military -0.0250**       -0.00430 
 (0.0115)       (0.0105) 
Agg. Gov. Index  0.00110**      7.29e-05 
  (0.000436)      (0.000389) 
Civil Liberties   0.00932*     0.000423 
   (0.00516)     (0.00308) 
KOF Index of Glob.    0.00141*    -0.000934 
    (0.000747)    (0.000881) 
Monetary Freedom     0.000407**   -0.000462 
     (0.000199)   (0.000373) 
Investment Freedom      0.000435**  1.44e-05 
      (0.000209)  (0.000194) 
Property Rights       0.000236 -0.000154 
       (0.000273) (0.000537) 
Constant 0.180** 0.935** 1.515** 8.174*** 7.417*** 7.429*** 7.320*** 0.0887 
 (0.0716) (0.387) (0.646) (1.361) (1.288) (1.311) (1.296) (0.0622) 
         
Observations 713 578 725 639 725 725 725 486 
Number of countries 42 44 44 44 44 44 44 42 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 4.21e-05 3.65e-05 2.54e-05 0.456 0.139 0.0140 0.0785 0.00137 
AR(2) 0.0176 0.00987 0.0122 0.528 0.811 0.912 0.895 0.0286 
AR(3) 0.200 0.268 0.424 0.0442 0.0720 0.0181 0.0153 0.268 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns indicate models, which have been estimated 
using System-GMM approach. Time dummies not reported to save space, while all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
used as instruments. The p-values of the Hansen OIR test is used to check the null hypothesis of instrument set being valid and 
exogenous, while the null of no autocorrelation is checked through Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests.   
 
Table 1(b). Dependent variable -real GDP- non-prolonged users 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Lag Log GDP 0.792*** 0.856*** 0.971*** 0.895*** 0.877*** 0.672*** 0.676*** 0.825*** 
 (0.0733) (0.0284) (0.0153) (0.0318) (0.0366) (0.0718) (0.0724) (0.0432) 
Log Population -0.0456* -0.0154 -0.00202 -0.0231** -0.104 -0.0722*** -0.0713*** -0.0245* 
 (0.0261) (0.00976) (0.00473) (0.0113) (0.0733) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0148) 
Government Spending 6.89e-05 0.000179 0.000134 0.000231 0.000111 9.82e-05 0.000146 -0.000219 
 (0.000227) (0.000269) (0.000333) (0.000201) (0.000221) (0.000178) (0.000176) (0.000330) 
Regime 0.131*       -0.0227 
 (0.0740)       (0.0299) 
Military -0.0698       0.0245 
 (0.0438)       (0.0472) 
Agg. Gov. Index  0.00352***      0.00420*** 
  (0.000895)      (0.000900) 
Civil Liberties   0.0119**     0.00585 
   (0.00533)     (0.00514) 
KOF Index of Glob.    0.00296**    0.00311** 
    (0.00119)    (0.00131) 
Monetary Freedom     0.000482*   0.000583 
     (0.000284)   (0.000619) 
Investment Freedom      0.000281  0.000131 
      (0.000352)  (0.000469) 
Property Rights       0.000261 0.000628 
       (0.000331) (0.000526) 
Constant 2.314** 1.198*** 0.226 1.044*** 2.565* 3.753*** 3.708*** 1.340*** 
 (0.909) (0.325) (0.159) (0.382) (1.359) (0.898) (0.905) (0.452) 
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Observations 1,082 945 1,172 1,034 1,182 1,182 1,182 731 
Number of countries 70 77 75 77 77 77 77 69 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0.00292 0.00113 0.00752 0.00729 0.00446 0.00290 0.00258 0.00366 
AR(2) 0.00292 0.0136 0.00394 0.0257 0.00309 0.00892 0.00898 0.110 
AR(3) 0.128 0.222 0.145 0.190 0.145 0.0643 0.0680 0.388 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns indicate models, which have been estimated 
using System-GMM approach. Time dummies not reported to save space, while all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
used as instruments. The p-values of the Hansen OIR test is used to check the null hypothesis of instrument set being valid and 
exogenous, while the null of no autocorrelation is checked through Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests.   
 
It may be pertinent here to indicate that the discussion will now move towards estimating 
and analysing Eq[2] for the purpose of establishing the first part (i.e., institutional impact 
on MII) of the overall indirect effect of institutional determinants on real GDP through 
macroeconomic stability. Tables 2(a) and 2(b), once again highlight the presence of 
dynamic process since lagged MII feeds positively (and virtually always significantly) in 
current MII, for both the prolonged and non-prolonged users. 
 
In the case of prolonged users, a military officer as chief executive significantly enhances 
MII, while as compared to presidential form of democracy, a parliamentary form of 
democracy significantly reduces macroeconomic instability. In a similar result, Satyanath  
and Subramanian (2004) indicated democracy significantly and positively affected 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
Aggregate governance index remains significantly negative for MII in the case of 
prolonged users, while it continues to dent (though insignificantly) in the case of non-
prolonged users. Having said that, a combined effect of other institutional determinants 
makes governance significantly negative for MII even in the case of non-prolonged users 
(as indicated in model 8 of Table 2(b)). Also civil liberties holds a negative consequence 
(though insignificantly) for prolonged users. 
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Arpac et al. (2008), for instance, indicated that trade openness helped in improving the 
implementation record of IMF programmes. In the current study, it can be seen that an 
improvement in KOF index of globalization significantly reduces MII in both the sub- 
groups, highlighting the importance of openness here (as was in the case of its impact on 
real GDP). Also, in both the sub-groups monetary freedom remains negatively significant 
for MII. 
 
In the case of prolonged users, the fact that investment freedom holds a negative yet 
insignificant consequence points towards the possible need of augmenting pro- investment 
institutional setup in these countries. On the other hand, in the case of non-prolonged users, 
the impact is positive (though insignificant; see model 6 of Table 2(b)) on MII. A remedy 
in offering may be to enforce certain needed controls on investment freedom so that 
investment freedom functions in a way so as to reduce MII (and in turn helps avoid an East 
Asian Crisis like situation of the late 90s, when lack of capital controls resulted in capital 
flight, in turn causing macroeconomic instability), and can significantly increase real GDP. 
 
Property rights has an insignificantly negative consequence for MII in the case of 
prolonged users, giving way to the argument that the supporting institutional framework 
needs to be strengthen to translate into a significant consequence for MII. Having said that, 
in the case on non-prolonged users, the impact of property rights is significantly positive 
on macroeconomic instability. 
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Table 2(a). Dependent variable -Macroeconomic Instability Index- prolonged users 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Lag MII 0.485*** -0.0976 0.258*** 0.518*** 0.232*** 0.176** 0.302*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0340) (0.105) (0.0773) (0.0353) (0.0806) (0.0885) (0.0450) (0.0426) 
Regime 0.00815       -0.0232 
 (0.0142)       (0.0213) 
Military 0.0232*       0.0310** 
 (0.0132)       (0.0145) 
Agg. Gov. Index  -0.0127**      -0.000523 
  (0.00643)      (0.00103) 
Civil Liberties   -0.00955     -0.00275 
   (0.00590)     (0.00768) 
KOF Index of Glob.    -0.00170***    -0.00122 
    (0.000507)    (0.000835) 
Monetary Freedom     -0.00167*   0.000992 
     (0.000998)   (0.000603) 
Investment Freedom      -0.00125  0.000579 
      (0.00122)  (0.000538) 
Property Rights       -0.00106 0.00104 
       (0.000844) (0.000858) 
Constant 0.271*** 0.822*** 0.418*** 0.279*** 0.376*** 0.422*** 0.357*** 0.0753 
 (0.0356) (0.237) (0.103) (0.0628) (0.0794) (0.0810) (0.0490) (0.0595) 
         
Observations 1,211 610 1,279 1,197 725 725 725 490 
Number of countries 42 44 44 44 44 44 44 42 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 0.857 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.991 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 1.04e-07 0.0254 6.50e-05 7.25e-08 0.000164 0.000262 6.44e-07 2.38e-05 
AR(2) 0.106 0.000975 0.0271 0.115 0.00275 0.00343 0.0120 0.235 
AR(3) 0.396 0.304 0.726 0.123 0.239 0.325 0.468 0.107 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns indicate models, which have been estimated 
using System-GMM approach. Time dummies not reported to save space, while all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
used as instruments. The p-values of the Hansen OIR test is used to check the null hypothesis of instrument set being valid and 
exogenous, while the null of no autocorrelation is checked through Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests.   
 
 
Table 2(b). Dependent variable -Macroeconomic Instability Index- non-prolonged 
users 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Lag MII 0.526*** 0.511*** 0.601*** 0.501*** 0.152 0.343** 0.258*** 0.603*** 
 (0.0427) (0.108) (0.0534) (0.0303) (0.144) (0.138) (0.0834) (0.0530) 
Regime -0.0890**       0.101 
 (0.0445)       (0.0818) 
Military -0.0203       -0.0493 
 (0.0282)       (0.0445) 
Agg. Gov. Index  -0.00260      -0.00679* 
  (0.00408)      (0.00397) 
Civil Liberties   0.00389     0.0186 
   (0.00293)     (0.0208) 
KOF Index of Glob.    -0.00287*    2.39e-05 
    (0.00161)    (0.00605) 
Monetary Freedom     -0.00365*   0.00251 
     (0.00193)   (0.00211) 
Investment Freedom      0.00160  0.00319*** 
      (0.00151)  (0.00120) 
Property Rights       -0.00503* 0.00133 
       (0.00292) (0.00215) 
Constant 0.250*** 0.288 0.264*** 0.306*** 0.660*** 0.110 0.483*** 0.183 
 (0.0491) (0.183) (0.0370) (0.0930) (0.150) (0.106) (0.156) (0.449) 
         
Observations 2,029 1,129 2,206 2,148 1,196 1,196 1,196 748 
Number of countries 74 84 81 82 79 79 79 70 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 0.115 1.000 1.000 0.395 0.280 0.304 1.000 
AR(1) 0 1.28e-06 3.12e-09 0 0.0474 0.00683 0.000687 3.39e-06 
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AR(2) 0.0113 0.916 0.293 0.483 1.66e-05 7.93e-05 0.000290 0.492 
AR(3) 0.221 0.610 0.265 0.586 0.539 0.141 0.171 0.207 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns indicate models, which have been estimated 
using System-GMM approach. Time dummies not reported to save space, while all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
used as instruments. The p-values of the Hansen OIR test is used to check the null hypothesis of instrument set being valid and 
exogenous, while the null of no autocorrelation is checked through Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests.   
 
As can be seen in Tables 3(a) and 3(b), predicted MII in most of the cases impact 
negatively on real GDP; while in certain cases the impact becomes significant, along with 
being negative. It can also be noted that while    , determined on the basis of a combined 
effect of all the institutional determinants, is significantly negative for real GDP in the case 
of prolonged users, it also reduces real GDP (though insignificantly) in the case of non-
prolonged users.   
 
Table 3(a). Dependent variable -real GDP- prolonged users 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Lag Log GDP 1.008*** 0.402*** 1.008*** 1.007*** 0.999*** 1.004*** 1.007*** 0.994*** 
 (0.00756) (0.0441) (0.00874) (0.00959) (0.0125) (0.00934) (0.00898) (0.00861) 
Government Spending 0.000448 0.000241* 0.000344 7.27e-05 0.000181 0.000658* 0.000504 0.000354 
 (0.000360) (0.000144) (0.000390) (0.000341) (0.000526) (0.000390) (0.000395) (0.000475) 
Log population -0.00617** -0.0803 -0.00466 -0.00413 -0.0149*** -0.00590* -0.00547* -0.00246 
 (0.00299) (0.0805) (0.00313) (0.00294) (0.00567) (0.00321) (0.00293) (0.00322) 
Predicted MII: Regime & Military -0.0528        
 (0.0506)        
Predicted MII: Agg. Gov. Index  -0.0947***       
  (0.0332)       
Predicted MII: Civil Liberties   -0.0830      
   (0.0999)      
Predicted MII: KOF Index of Glob.    -0.0383     
    (0.0467)     
Predicted MII: Monetary Freedom     -0.107    
     (0.116)    
Predicted MII: Investment Freedom      -0.0700   
      (0.155)   
Predicted MII: Property Rights       -0.100  
       (0.0894)  
Predicted MII: All Institutional Det.        -0.207*** 
        (0.0661) 
Constant 0.0611 5.552*** 0.0576 0.0514 0.311* 0.0750 0.0719 0.150*** 
 (0.0465) (1.467) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.163) (0.0893) (0.0641) (0.0427) 
         
Observations 712 576 723 639 723 723 723 486 
Number of countries 42 44 44 44 44 44 44 42 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.978 
AR(1) 5.30e-05 0.329 4.65e-05 0.000197 6.22e-05 1.40e-05 2.95e-05 0.00256 
AR(2) 0.0137 0.163 0.0118 0.0401 0.0148 0.0160 0.0125 0.0305 
AR(3) 0.107 0.555 0.155 0.204 0.186 0.238 0.129 0.688 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns indicate models, which have been estimated 
using System-GMM approach. Time dummies not reported to save space, while all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
used as instruments. The p-values of the Hansen OIR test is used to check the null hypothesis of instrument set being valid and 
exogenous, while the null of no autocorrelation is checked through Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests.   
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Table 3(b). Dependent variable -real GDP- non-prolonged users 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Lag Log GDP 1.001*** 0.447*** 1.002*** 1.013*** 0.987*** 1.023*** 0.883*** 0.510*** 
 (0.00227) (0.0672) (0.00208) (0.00842) (0.00913) (0.0103) (0.0368) (0.119) 
Government Spending -4.89e-05 0.000186 5.10e-05 0.000382 -0.000589 -4.76e-05 0.000248 0.000457 
 (0.000105) (0.000238) (0.000116) (0.000494) (0.000820) (0.000741) (0.000218) (0.000659) 
Log population 0.00164 -0.120* 0.00232 0.00395 0.00694 0.00371 -0.121 -0.0466 
 (0.00146) (0.0710) (0.00182) (0.00315) (0.00772) (0.00766) (0.0754) (0.0723) 
Pred. MII: Regime & Military -0.0662***        
 (0.0218)        
Predicted MII: Agg. Gov. Index  -0.0233       
  (0.0182)       
Predicted MII: Civil Liberties   -0.0477*      
   (0.0266)      
Predicted MII: KOF Index of Glob.    -0.166**     
    (0.0839)     
Predicted MII: Monetary Freedom     -0.596**    
     (0.257)    
Predicted MII: Investment Freedom      -0.223   
      (0.168)   
Predicted MII: Property Rights       -0.00176  
       (0.0339)  
Predicted MII: All Institutional Det.        -0.0451 
        (0.306) 
Constant 0.0199 6.342*** -0.0113 -0.104 0.310 -0.120 2.883** 4.636*** 
 (0.0355) (1.303) (0.0431) (0.113) (0.226) (0.160) (1.416) (1.705) 
         
Observations 1,068 930 1,158 1,032 1,166 1,166 1,166 731 
Number of countries 70 77 75 77 77 77 77 69 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.519 0.754 0.215 1.000 0.185 
AR(1) 0.0146 0.166 0.0114 0.0196 0.0108 0.0187 0.00448 0.243 
AR(2) 0.00539 0.103 0.00385 0.0241 0.00257 0.00464 0.00438 0.209 
AR(3) 0.166 0.0585 0.139 0.184 0.147 0.125 0.132 0.226 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns indicate models, which have been estimated 
using System-GMM approach. Time dummies not reported to save space, while all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
used as instruments. The p-values of the Hansen OIR test is used to check the null hypothesis of instrument set being valid and 
exogenous, while the null of no autocorrelation is checked through Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests.   
 
 
Summing up. Tables 1(a) and 1(b) are in line with the premise laid out in Eq[1], which 
indicates that institutional determinants have an overall significantly positive effect on real 
GDP, for both the prolonged and non-prolonged users. At the same time, support for the 
second premise that institutional determinants negatively impact MII (indicated in Eq[2]) 
can be seen in the estimations reflected in Tables 2(a) and 2(b), where most of the 
institutional determinants have a negative, and in certain cases, a significant effect on MII. 
Lastly, the third premise that the predicted MII (estimated from institutional determinants 
in Eq[2]) have a negative impact on real GDP, stands also supported by most of the 
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estimations indicated by Tables 3(a) and 3(b). This, along with the fact that these 
institutional determinants, in the first place, are the ones that significantly impacted 
economic- and political institutional quality in programme countries during 1980-2010 (the 
same time period as of the current study)16. Overall, therefore, it makes sense to highlight 
in the light of estimations above, that the missing link of institutions for reaching a positive 
economic growth consequence does in fact exist in IMF programme countries. Hence, 
these significant institutional determinants need to be focused upon in future IMF 
programmes, since it can be seen that they positively affect real GDP both directly, and 
also indirectly through first negatively impacting MII, and then the predicted MII 
negatively affecting real GDP.  
 
Robustness check 
 
Table 4 estimates the impact of MII data on the real GDP data, indicating in turn that there 
exists a significantly negative relationship between real GDP and MII, in both the 
prolonged users and the non-prolonged users. This can be seen as a robustness check for 
estimations of real GDP and predicted MII (in Tables  3(a) and 3(b)), where a negative 
relationship also exists in most of the cases, in both the sub-groups.  
 
 
Table 4. Dependent variable -real GDP- prolonged and non-prolonged users 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Prolonged Users Non-Prolonged Users 
   
Lag Log GDP 1.000*** 0.683*** 
 (0.00165) (0.0687) 
Government Spending 6.57e-05 0.000118 
 (0.000143) (0.000158) 
Log Population -0.00307* -0.0722*** 
                                                                 
16
 For details see Javed (2014). 
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 (0.00164) (0.0270) 
MII -0.0457*** -0.0464*** 
 (0.0106) (0.00987) 
Constant 0.0820*** 3.624*** 
 (0.0303) (0.863) 
   
Observations 719 1,153 
Number of countries 44 77 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 3.73e-05 0.00142 
AR(2) 0.0175 0.0183 
AR(3) 0.591 0.0558 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns indicate models, which have been estimated 
using System-GMM approach. Time dummies not reported to save space, while all available lagged values of endogenous variables 
used as instruments. The p-values of the Hansen OIR test is used to check the null hypothesis of instrument set being valid and 
exogenous, while the null of no autocorrelation is checked through Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The problem of a lackluster performance of IMF programmes in terms of economic growth 
in recipient countries on one hand, and NIE literature's highlighting of the important role 
institutions play in enhancing economic growth in many countries, on the other, created in 
turn, a 'missing link' that served as a motivation for the current study. Subsequently, the 
impact of institutional determinants (both political and economic) were found to be overall 
significant for enhancing real economic growth of the prolonged- and non-prolonged users 
of IMF. At the same time, institutional determinants were also found to be significant in 
reducing macroeconomic instability, which in turn, indirectly (through the channel of 
macroeconomic instability) enhanced real GDP growth.  
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Appendix-A 
IMF Programme Countries 
Non-Prolonged Users Prolonged Users 
1 Afghanistan  45 Korea  Mali 1 
2 Angola 46 Kosovo  Senegal 2 
3 Antigua and Barbuda  47 Latvia  Mexico 3 
4 Azerbaijan  48 Lebanon  Mozambique 4 
5 Bangladesh  49 Lesotho  Niger 5 
6 Barbados  50 Liberia Madagascar  6 
7 Belarus  51 Lithuania  Malawi 7 
8 Belize  52 Maldives  Mauritania 8 
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina  53 Mauritius Tanzania 9 
10 Brazil  54 Moldova  Uganda 10 
11 Cambodia  55 Morocco  Benin  11 
12 Cape Verde  56 Nepal  Burkina Faso 12 
13 Central African Republic  57 Papua New Guinea  Cameroon 13 
14 Chile 58 Peru  Albania 14 
15 China  59 Poland  Argentina 15 
16 Comoros  60 Portugal  Bolivia 16 
17 Congo, Democratic Republic of the  61 Romania  Kyrgyz Republic 17 
18 Congo, Republic of  62 Samoa Guyana 18 
19 Costa Rica  63 Serbia  Sierra Leone 19 
20 Cyprus  64 Singapore  Armenia 20 
21 Czech Republic  65 Slovak Republic           Chad 21 
22 Côte d'Ivoire 66 Slovenia Pakistan 22 
23 Djibouti  67 Solomon Islands  Rwanda 23 
24 Ecuador  68 Somalia  Georgia 24 
25 Egypt  69 Spain  Guinea 25 
26 Equatorial Guinea  70 Sri Lanka  Philippines 26 
27 Estonia  71 St. Kitts and Nevis  Zambia 27 
28 Ethiopia  72 St. Lucia  Bulgaria 28 
29 Fiji  73 St. Vincent and the Grenadines  Burundi 29 
30 Gabon  74 Syrian Arab Republic  
Dominican 
Republic 
30 
31 Gambia  75 Thailand Ghana 31 
32 Grenada  76 Togo Jordan 32 
33 Guatemala  77 Trinidad and Tobago  Turkey 33 
34 Guinea-Bissau  78 Tunisia  Dominica 34 
35 Haiti  79 Ukraine  Honduras 35 
36 Hungary  80 Uruguay Nicaragua 36 
37 Iceland  81 Uzbekistan  Tajikistan 37 
38 India  82 Venezuela, República Bolivariana de  Lao 38 
39 Indonesia  83 Vietnam  Macedonia 39 
40 Iraq  84 Yemen, Republic of  Panama 40 
41 Israel  85 Zimbabwe  Mongolia 41 
42 Jamaica      Serbia 42 
43 Kazakhstan      Algeria 43 
44 Kenya      Russian Fed. 44 
 
